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Symposium-The Business of Climate Change: Challenges
and Opportunities for Multinational Business Enterprises

Rawls' Theory of Justice and International Environmental
Law: A Philosophical Perspective
Todd B. Adams*
I. INTRODUCTION

John Rawls undertook the task of supporting the dominant liberal ideas of
social justice during the U.S. civil rights era.' He wanted to show that certain
political ideas such as free speech, the right to vote, and anti-discrimination laws
could be justified universally by political philosophy.2 He also wanted to show
that social justice required a minimum of economic justice: those who had little
could justly demand of those who had more to share.3 To do this, he drew on
modern psychology and economic theory, as well as social contract theory.
Applying Rawls' theory of justice to environmental issues is difficult,
however, because the risk-aversion built into Rawls' theory means that people
will overuse natural resources. When applied to international environmental
issues, Rawlsian ideas of justice turn out to be based on theories of reason that
are particular to Western democracies. When applied to intergenerational
environmental issues, Rawls' theory of justice requires too many assumptions to
produce reliable principles.
Nevertheless, the power of Rawls' theory is that even failure is not fruitless.
Risk-aversion will not work to solve many environmental problems, but its
failure causes embracing risk more fully. Ideas of reason cannot support
universal principles for all nations, but they can help define acceptable principles.
One can question and reformulate the assumptions used in deciding intergenerational justice in order to better understand the environmental challenges
we face. This makes applying Rawls' theory of justice to environmental issues
well worth the effort because it suggests that one must accept more risk to
combat global warming and continue to develop multiple approaches to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. It also supports requiring all nations to agree to a cap
on greenhouse emissions, not just those who did so in the Kyoto Protocol.
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1. ROBERTO ALEJANDRO, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE 1 (1998).
2. Rawls described his theory of justice as the "best approximation to our considered convictions of
justice." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE, Introduction, xvii (1998).
3.

See JOHN RAWLS, PREFERENCE FOR THE REVISED EDITION, IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE XV (1999)

("Basic institutions must from the outset put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, the
productive means to be fully cooperating members of a society.").
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II. THE ORIGINAL POSITION IN RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

The social contract theory is familiar: individuals give up some liberty to
government in return for security and other social goods they cannot get
otherwise. Rawls' contribution to this venerable political theory was to imagine
what contract people would form before they knew who they would be in the
society. They would be in what Rawls called the "original position. ' 4 People in
the original position would be behind a "veil of ignorance." The veil of ignorance
prevents anyone in the original position from knowing their race, sex, or other
characteristics in the world-to-be.5 Therefore, they would be better able to ignore
irrational prejudices and unanimously agree upon the fundamental rules that
would govern society.
Rawls sets himself the task of determining these rules in a very general, or
what the author calls a "thin" way . He asks what social contract a rich or poor
person would agree to, a member of the majority or minority would agree to, and
so on. The representatives must agree on a social contract that protects a variety
of competing values, forcing a balance. But, Rawls adds another assumption to
ensure that the representative individuals do not hold out for one value: that a
rational person impartially values all aspects of life. Reason is the main tool for
finding agreement, whereas most emotional, cultural, and spiritual values count
for little.
What is left to guide those in the original position other than reason? First,
there is a sense of justice But justice is "weak" because it contains no definite
content. The specifics of justice are what the representative people in the original
position decide they are to be.9 Nonetheless, Rawls must make still more
assumptions to develop more specific contractual provisions governing fairness.
To discuss intergenerational justice at all, he must assume that parents care for
their offspring,' and that an improvement of the least-favored class will improve
all classes above it." Finally, he assumes that a just society need only be fairly
well-off materially. 2
The individuals reaching unanimous agreement behind the veil of ignorance
represent economic classes.' 3 One individual represents the very rich, others
represent various levels of the middle classes, and still others represent the
working and poorer classes down to the poorest class in the society. This
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.at 15-19.
ld.at 118.
Id.at 349.
Id.at 11.
Id.
Id.at 5-8.
Id. at 254-55.
Id.at 70-72.
Id.at 252.
See, e.g., id. at 81-85.
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approach enabled Rawls to argue that individuals in the original position would
not agree to a social contract that allowed others to gain wealth unless the leastfavored class benefited from the gain.'4 This idea, which Rawls called the
"difference principle," that those who gain wealth because of the social contract
must share it with the least-favored class, seems reasonable in the United States.
Since Franklin Roosevelt, most Americans have agreed that society should
ensure a basic living level and economic opportunity for everyone.
The attractions of the original position and Rawls' theory of justice in
deciding intergenerational and international environmental issues are obvious. In
the original position, representative individuals will not know when they will be
born. They might be born early in the history of the world when environmental
conditions are good and natural resources are plenty, or they might live when
environmental conditions have deteriorated and natural resources are scarce.
They might live in an industrialized, economically developed country or in a
developing one. Their standard of living might be very high or impoverished.
Those in the original position must decide, therefore, the minimum access to
natural resources and environmental conditions necessary for every generation to
agree to a social contract. Rational individuals may prefer a pristine environment
and abundant natural resources, but they also understand some pollution
inevitably occurs from human activities.
These problems weaken any claims of universal environmental principles
based on Rawls' theory of justice and the original position, but they do not make
worthless the exercise of considering how individuals would decide international
and intergenerational environmental issues. The idea of the original position
remains an effective way to identify and eliminate preconceptions and prejudices
about people and nations. In discussing and trying to solve problems inherent in
using the original position to address international environmental issues, one may
confirm the fundamental ideas about what is just, as well as develop new insights
into how to fairly address international environmental issues.
Social contract theories are only as good as the assumptions used to develop
them. Assumptions never perfectly match the world, but this does not make
social contract theories, such as Rawls' theory of justice, worthless. They must
be used cautiously. Their assumptions must be carefully justified. When the
social contract theory is applied to concrete problems, the assumptions must be
refined as much as possible to give more useful answers.

14.
15.

Id. at 65-68.
The extensive social welfare programs in the United States show the broad agreement.
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III. RISK AND THE ORIGINAL POSITION
Rawls abandoned the idea that individuals in the original position are riskaverse as too problematic of an idea on which to base his theory.' 6 Instead, he
restated his theory of justice as a political theory rather than a moral one.17
Nevertheless, the question of how representative individuals in the original
position should approach risk is crucial to thinking about justice and environmental issues. After probing how individuals in the original position should
decide environmental issues, it is clear that the world needs to take more risks
and to rethink what it means to be risk-averse.
Rawls defined "risk-averse" to mean that individuals in the original position
would rather ensure that they have a little of something and forgo the chance of
being rich than face the possibility that they might be born in a world with
nothing.'8 This classic definition of "risk-averse" invites the tragedy of the
commons. The tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals use a common,
essentially free, resource. Every individual has a strong incentive to use the
resource as much as possible for their own benefit. But there comes a point at
which individuals begin to overuse the common resource. As a group, this
behavior is irrational because everyone loses when the resource is destroyed. For
each individual, however, continuing to exploit the resource intensively ensures
that they have a little of something rather than nothing at all.
Risk-averse behavior of individuals will cause disasters. For many years,
scholars and policymakers have advocated coordinating the behavior of
individuals to ensure that the results for individuals match those for society as a
whole. Market forces, command-and-control regulatory schemes, and moral
persuasion all have a role in matching individual results with overall societal
good.
The tragedy of the commons is also a problem of long-term versus short-term
benefit. In the short term, risk-averse individuals ensure their prosperity. In the
long term, they ensure the opposite. This means that no absolute, or objective,
definition of "risk-averse" exists. Risk-averse behavior, as defined by Rawls, is
risk-averse in the short term. In the long run, such behavior is highly risky
because it must assume that enough natural resources exist to avoid the tragedy
of the commons.
In the very long run, the assumption that there are enough natural resources
for everyone is surely wrong. The world will end someday. Even in the relative
short run, say several hundred years, this assumption is difficult to make. The
world is warming. Energy use continues to increase. Energy use and pollution in
developing countries such as India 9 and China ° are rapidly increasing. If per16.
17.
18.
19.

JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:

A

RESTATEMENT, PREFACE, xvii

(2001).

Id.
RAWLS, supra note 2, at 132-134.
Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: India: Oil and Coal, available at
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capita greenhouse gas emissions in those two countries reach the levels of U.S.
per-capita greenhouse gas emissions, then global warming will greatly increase.
Reconsidering risk in environmental issues leads to the conclusion that
individuals in the original position must accept more risk than Rawls assumes if
they want to ensure their economic well-being. This might mean privatizing the
commons, governmental control of human reproduction, or mandatory weekly
political indoctrination on the importance of conservation. None of these will
likely draw applause in the mainstream American press, but representative
individuals in the original position might well agree on a social contract that
allows these results rather than risk the danger of a tragedy of the commons
because too few natural resources exist.
Reconsidering risk requires us to question our assumptions about natural
resources, but it does not require us to abandon the original position and the veil
of ignorance. Rawls has put the wrong question to the representative individuals
in the original position if the goal is to address environmental issues. One should
not ask what would risk-averse individuals in the original position agree to, but
what attitude would risk individuals in the original position adopt if they wanted
the best chance to live in a reasonably fair, sustainable world.
The answer to this question would differ depending on the state of the world.
If there were enough natural resources for the human race to exist in a nearutopian state for eons, then a Rawlsian approach toward risk might well be
chosen. If few natural resources exist, then the representative individuals might
choose the approach of emphasizing economic development at any cost in an
effort to assure the greatest opportunity that they would be born into a world
where they would have some chance of happiness. But a person does not know
the type of world that he or she lives in. Will global warming cause a new Ice
Age? Will the earth become another Venus, incapable of supporting life? By the
time the likely answers to these questions are known, it may be too late, and new
problems will need to be addressed.
If the goal is to give everybody the best chance to live in a reasonably fair,
sustainable world, then the individuals in the original position must take into
account uncertainty about the world's natural resources. This means that
individuals in the original position could not commit to one approach to risk.
Financial models applied to the stock market provide a useful analogy. In
these models, economists have shown that buying safe stocks is not the most
likely method for producing the desired minimum return. The danger of inflation
makes this strategy less likely to assure a minimum return. Similarly, choosing to
buy the most risky stocks would be less likely to assure a minimum return
because of the danger of a stock market crash. Instead, diversification is most
likely to assure a minimum return because it covers more alternatives.

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
20. Id.
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Similarly, individuals in the original position would choose institutions that
develop numerous, different responses in order to assure the best chance to live
in a reasonably fair, sustainable world. If, as Rawls originally reasoned, people
are risk-averse, then representative individuals in the original position would
want to agree on institutions that encourage individuals to take risks. The
tendency of institutions to suppress individuality and risk-taking would also
support emphasizing risk-taking. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
worth noting that this approach could justify freedom of speech, individual
control of economic decisions, and limited government.
Representative individuals in the original position would want some people
to undertake activities that expand the available common natural resource pool
by economic development. They would design society to allow, and in some
cases, encourage risk takers. The original position has shown that a world run by
faceless, nameless, risk-averse bureaucrats accomplishes nothing great and
contributes nothing to the future. Only risk-taking can avoid the tragedy of the
commons by encouraging cooperation or by expanding the pie so that the tragedy
of the commons does not happen for at least a few years later.
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Rawls then applied his theory of justice to the "law of peoples" to distinguish
it from the law of nation-states. Individuals representing each people, or nation,
would gather together to agree on a social contract among nations from behind a
veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing the exact conditions of the
nation they represent. From this he developed a set of reasonable principles on
which to base the law of nations. Several problems prevent the easy extension of
Rawls' theory of justice into international issues. First, Rawlsian ideas about
reason are associated with Western thought, specifically the Enlightenment.
Second, individuals representing nations lack the necessary incentives to reach
agreement on any principle. Third, environmental issues require us to confront
the problem of valuing environmental goods that Rawls avoided. As with the
previous difficulties with risk-averse behavior, these problems force a fruitful
reconsideration of the original position.
First, Rawls' theory of justice has deep roots in Western philosophy. He
relies on Kant, who more than anyone else, founded modem philosophy in
Europe. 2' This tradition established the primacy of reason over revelation in
philosophy. Rawls relies on Locke,22 who epitomizes the popular understanding
of the Scottish enlightenment and used reason to speculate on how and why
governments first formed in order to identify natural rights. Rawls sees himself
as defending this tradition against another Western philosophy-that of

21.
22.

RAWLS, supra note 2 at

Id.

10.
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utilitarianism, according to which governments should pursue the greater societal
good in all cases.23
Many individuals and cultures lack this faith in reason, especially in
developing countries. Some nations base their culture on deeply held religious
beliefs or ethical norms. For example, some American-Indians differentiate
themselves from the dominant American culture by rejecting materialism,
consumerism, and resource development. 24 Some claim a deep spirituality based
on reverence for nature and the earth."
The Western bias of Rawls' theory of justice is inherent in his work. In the
end, all that can be said is that if one wants to use Rawls, then one must accept
the role of reason in his work. It is not an irrational choice. Reason, unlike faith,
makes no universal claim, and if properly used, can help nations and individuals
live in understanding and mutual coexistence. But, regardless of his success in
this matter, Rawls is a Western philosopher who depends on reason. In his view,
reason can allow for these beliefs, but reason must decide all questions.
Accepting reason does not require us to accept various forms of Western
materialism that seem to go hand-in-hand with reason, religious tolerance,
individualism, and democracy. Rawls recognized this problem in his book The
Law of Peoples.26 He divided the world into Western democracies, reasonably
decent hierarchical peoples, and outlaw states; the United States pursued a
different foreign policy with regard to each.27
The second problem in using A Theory of Justice to decide international
environmental issues arises from the nature of the original position. In the
original position as initially described, individuals often represented economic
classes. This allowed Rawls to assume a unity of interest among the individuals
represented. All working-class people may have relatively similar economic
interests, and so forth. Even a highly homogenous society has winners and losers
on many issues.
This assumption fails when considering international problems. There is no
reason to believe that a single individual can adequately represent the interests of
a nation. Most notably, nations have economic winners and losers. One could try
to solve this problem by having more individuals represent each nation along
23. Whether Rawls succeeds in defending natural law from the all-encompassing claims of utilitarianism
is an open question. I think that he does succeed in showing there is a place for "natural law" in the twenty-first
century.
24. WINONA LADUKE, ALL OUR RELATIONS: NATIVE STRUGGLES FOR LAND AND LIFE 5-6 (1999).
25. JAN ITARTKE, INTRODUCTION TO MOTHER EARTH SPIRITUALITY: NATIVE AMERICAN PATHS TO
HEALING OURSELVES AND OUR WORLD xiii ("The perspective of Native Americans in regard to Mother Earth
spirituality holds great promise for the environmental movement.").
26. See id. at 9-10 (stating that the purpose of developing the Law of Peoples is to "work out the ideals
and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people") (emphasis added).
27. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 10 (Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
28. Chartier wrote an interesting and informative critique on how the original position changes when
applied internationally rather than domestically. Gary Chartier, People or Persons? Revising Rawls on Global
Justice, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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economic class lines. Or, one could have an individual represent the working
class in the United States, another individual representing the working class in
India, and so forth. But the working class in the United States will likely have
much better economic conditions than their counterparts in the developing world.
They will also face different types of problems.
There is also no particular reason to believe that nations will have the same
interests as those who make up the nation. 9 Those who benefit from the status
quo resist change. People oppressed by their national governments will likely
want a change in government. Therefore, whoever represents the nation in the
original position determines the result.
Making individuals in the original position represent classes also allowed
Rawls to assume that benefiting the least-well-off class would generally benefit
all classes above it. Neither of these assumptions holds when addressing
international issues. ° Helping Uganda, Ethiopia, and other poor African nations
may not affect the lives of those in Mongolia, Turkestan, and other Asian
countries. These countries are not economically linked as the economic classes of
a single nation are.
Third, Rawls avoided the difficult question of how to value economic goods
by leaving the specific results to the bargaining of the parties. To satisfy the
"difference" principle, the more economically-favored classes benefiting from a
change must only assure that the least-favored class receives some benefit. The
amount of the benefit is not determined by the theory of justice so long as some
benefit accrues.
In environmental issues, however, one must directly confront valuation
problems. For example, what is the value of a pristine Grand Canyon? When a
researcher asks how much money one would demand before allowing the
destruction of the Grand Canyon, the figure is often very large. When a
researcher asks how much money one is willing to pay to preserve the Grand
Canyon in its pristine state, the answer is likely much less.
Further, as a good (for which demand increases with one's income), the
demand for a pristine Grand Canyon will be greater among wealthy U.S. citizens
than poor Mexican citizens. This will make reaching an agreement in the original
position more difficult. The wealthier classes may lose more than the leastfavored class will gain in absolute dollars and cents. Some of the wealthier
classes surely will believe that keeping the Grand Canyon pristine cannot be
valued monetarily. Proportionally, the least-favored class may gain significantly
more from greater employment, low-cost housing, and basic medical care than
wealthier classes. If everyone acts in their own best interest, this difference
between absolute and proportional benefits may prevent an agreement.
29. Rawls wrote that his law of peoples "is fair to peoples and not to individual persons." RAwLS, supra
note 27 at 17 n.9. How a nation treats other nations and how it treats its own citizens are two different subjects.
Id. at 83.
30. Rawls would write that his assumption of "close-knittedness" fails. See id. at 70-72.
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Nonetheless, there is a way forward, but more information is needed about
the specific environmental choices facing society, such as global warming.
Unfortunately, all scientific predictions about global warming and its effects are
tentative and may prove wrong. The effects of global warming may include a
new Ice Age in the Northern Hemisphere or the long-term rising of the oceans.
The great uncertainty about the effects of global warming prevents any easy
agreement between individuals in the original position.
The best that can be done is to have representative individuals in the original
position consider various factual scenarios. They could then agree on the terms
for each scenario. If these terms are all the same, then they may reach an
agreement. Most likely, however, the terms will differ. The individuals will then
have to evaluate the likelihood of each scenario occurring and the consequences
of a wrong choice.
V. INTERGENERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Justice in intergenerational environmental issues raises a difficult problem
for all theories of justice, including Rawls' theory. While it is reasonable and fair
to argue that a person's situation at birth-whether she is born intelligent or
not-is unrelated to her personal merit, it is not reasonable to argue that birth
status always has nothing to do with merit. The behavior of the child's parents
before birth can affect a person's birth status. A mother who smokes and drinks
can seriously affect the future health of her child. Society can also shape the
newborn for good or ill by providing free health care for the mother-to-be. This
means that individuals in the original position must consider the merit and desires
of others when agreeing on a social contract theory to govern intergenerational
justice.
This point about merit is easily made. In the United States, a child's chance
of becoming President of the United States depends on many factors. Were her
parents sharecroppers or industrialists? Was she born in 1900 or 2000? In an
example more on point, children in developing nations face radically different
prospects than those born in modem industrial democracies, such as the United
States.
On the other hand, parents, grandparents, and others often work to improve
future generations. The merits of the parents can therefore very much affect the
prospects of their children and grandchildren. Eliminating this powerful force for
improvement seems both unwise and impossible. It is unwise because this force
often helps to improve the human condition; it is impossible because natural
selection has built parental instincts into human beings. Equally, some unfair,
even criminal, decisions or actions in the past can give newborns an unfair
advantage over others. Debates over whether a particular advantage is fair are
almost inevitably contentious and never-ending.
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Such debate over the fairest course to pursue environmental issues inevitably
leads to the tragedy of the commons, whether or not nationalism is involved.
Governments must act to regulate pollution to avoid this tragedy. They can do so
by delaying action on pollution through command-and-control or by market
systems, but they must act to make the individual cost of pollution equal to the
social cost of pollution.
Representative individuals in the original position will fail, however, to
decide on the best way to achieve this for many reasons. This article has already
examined a few of the reasons: representative individuals lack the necessary
information to properly value environmental goods; the weak sense of justice
held by those in the original position does not allow for the powerful emotions
necessary to motivate sacrifices; and enlightened self-interest conflicts with selfsacrifice for others.
Equally fundamental, social contract theories provide little help with issues
requiring historical consciousness. Social contract theories often assume that one
set of terms can work for all human societies for all time, but nothing in history
suggests this is true. Hunters and gatherers often have different needs and wants
than early agriculturalists, and both groups would find the modem United States
difficult to understand or accept. Types of government and systems of law vary
from one nation to another. Therefore, incorporating historical differences into
the original position would destroy the necessary consensus.
Three suggestions, although none perfect, may help Rawls' theory of justice
become more meaningful in intergenerational environmental issues. First,
historical claims for justice should be limited to those involving environmental
issues. The process of solving environmental issues will not include the solving
of claims for exploitation and oppression. This does not make the latter claims
unimportant or invalid, but separation is necessary to allow agreement in the
original position.
Second, and perhaps more controversially, newborns in the modern industrial
democracies should be born innocent. The demerits and crimes of their parents
and ancestors are not theirs. Further, mere participation in the society into which
they were born should not make them guilty. Representative individuals in the
original position would not know whether they might become the children of
guilty parents, and therefore, would make guilt depend on individual choices and
not birth status. Finally, any hope of creating a structure that can fairly solve all
environmental problems for all time should be surrendered. History teaches that
people and nations vary too much for such a grand goal.
Intergenerational environmental justice issues push Rawls' theory of justice
to the brink of uselessness. But, by severely limiting its claims to universality and
narrowing its focus, this article intends to provide some hope of using it
fruitfully.
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VI. USING RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS TO
ADDRESS GLOBAL WARMING

For many reasons, using Rawls' theory of justice as fairness in global
warming has proven extremely difficult. His approach to risk was wrong for
environmental issues. Rawls' use of reason and other ideas from the
Enlightenment seriously compromised his theory's claim to universality. Finally,
intergenerational environmental issues cause problems so severe that Rawls'
theory needs careful limiting to be useful. Nonetheless, enough of Rawls' theory
remains to test whether the partial cap on greenhouse emissions included in the
Kyoto Protocol meets Rawls' theory of justice.
Reason would support a wide range of attitudes toward risk. Some people
would prefer to maximize their chances of being born into a modem,
industrialized democracy instead of being assured that any traditional society
they are born into meets minimum standards. Further, risk-averse behavior on a
national or global scale requires that human beings plan for a variety of possible
outcomes rather than risking everything on one strategy that might not work.
This allows people some choice after birth about which society they enter.
Finally, representative individuals in the original position would know that
global warming will inevitably cause massive changes to some traditional
nations. Ice caps will melt. Animals, on which some traditional nations rely, may
die out locally or globally. It is impossible for traditional nations to remain the
same because of global warming or global development. The question is how to
manage that change.
This article argues that representative people in the original position would
agree upon a social contract with the widest possible range of choice for
traditional nations and their citizens. The concept of justice as fairness suggests
that traditional nations would retain their political rights in the form of the right
to choose from options presented by interactions with modern, industrialized
democracies. These options would range from minimal to full integration as a
nation and as individual citizens.
The Kyoto Protocol contains no commitments regarding the political rights
of traditional nations. It speaks only of "common but differentiated responsibilities."3' While other treaties and documents speak of indigenous rights,
analysis using Rawls' theory of justice suggests that this separation is inadequate.
Treaties addressing global warming should directly address its impact on
traditional nations.
The Kyoto Protocol contained a cap on emissions of greenhouse gases for
certain nations. 32 China, India, and other developing nations rejected the cap as

31. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10, Dec. 11,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
32. Id. at Art. 3.
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impossible for them because it would unfairly limit their economic growth.33
Some people believed that the rejection was based on the West's historically
greater emissions of greenhouse gases and history of colonization and exploitation. 34 Even accepting as likely that the West's history of colonization and
exploitation caused greater emission of greenhouse gases and greater economic
development in the modem Western industrial democracies, the issue should fall
to the side in future discussion. As previously discussed, this claim destroys the
focus on fairly solving environmental issues in the original position.
Further, the representative individuals in the original position will agree on
terms for the next hundred years or so. If one assumes that they will not be riskaverse as initially defined by Rawls, but will approach risk from a broader
perspective that encourages some risk-taking, they will approach uncertainty by
agreeing on the likely causes of, effects of, and possible solutions to, global
warming over the next several hundred years. In a full discussion, they would
discuss reasonable alternatives to the most likely course of global warming and
try to decide how their actions would or should differ.
For purposes of this article, it is assumed that global warming will most
likely cause moderate, gradual, and largely controllable effects in rich, developed
countries but more severe, even catastrophic, events for some developing
countries. Would individuals in the original position, not knowing whether they
would live in modem industrial democracies or in developing countries, agree on
a social contract that allowed developing nations like China or India to avoid any
caps on emissions in order to foster economic growth? This article argues they
would not. The individuals might find themselves living on a Pacific atoll or in
Bangladesh, where they would face the catastrophic effects of global warming.
They would not care who emitted the greenhouse gases, only that they were
emitted. They would not accept that the need for economic development in China
and India outweighed their own rights.
But they also would know that they might face catastrophic effects in any
event. Drastic reductions of future emissions by China, India, or the United
States might not stop the flooding and death. What would the individuals agree
upon knowing this is possible? The individuals most likely would not impose a
stringent cap at this time. Instead, they would focus on getting agreement on the
concept of a cap. Too stringent a cap would limit the economic growth necessary
to pay for their relocation or for new technology that might help them. In other
words, they would hedge their bets.

33. See, e.g., Anup Shah, Climate Justice and Equity, available at http://www.Globalissues.org/
Envlssues/GlobalWarming/Justice.
34. See, e.g., Yin Shao Long, Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, available at http://www.
twnside.org.sg/title/ysl.htm.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Refining Rawls' theory of justice shows that the Kyoto Protocol should have
included a cap of greenhouse emissions for all nations. This would require
developing nations to take more risks. It should also require the industrialized
world to help traditional nations more. These conclusions come from the careful
reworking of Rawls' theory of justice in order to apply it to international
environmental problems. This reworking has severely challenged Rawls' theory,
but the challenge has proven fruitful.

